Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Optimal Provision of Public Goods : A Synthesis. / Kreiner, Claus Thustrup; Verdelin, Nicolaj.

Munich, 2009.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Kreiner, CT & Verdelin, N 2009 'Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis' Munich.

APA

Kreiner, C. T., & Verdelin, N. (2009). Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis. Munich.

Vancouver

Kreiner CT, Verdelin N. Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis. Munich. 2009.

Author

Kreiner, Claus Thustrup ; Verdelin, Nicolaj. / Optimal Provision of Public Goods : A Synthesis. Munich, 2009.

Bibtex

@techreport{9adf10b009a811df825d000ea68e967b,
title = "Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis",
abstract = "There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision of public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the non-linear income tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good without imposing strong assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision are completely different and the traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in a very special case.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, public good provision, distortionary taxation, distribution",
author = "Kreiner, {Claus Thustrup} and Nicolaj Verdelin",
note = "JEL Classifications: H41, H23, H11",
year = "2009",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Optimal Provision of Public Goods

T2 - A Synthesis

AU - Kreiner, Claus Thustrup

AU - Verdelin, Nicolaj

N1 - JEL Classifications: H41, H23, H11

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision of public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the non-linear income tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good without imposing strong assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision are completely different and the traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in a very special case.

AB - There currently exist two competing approaches in the literature on the optimal provision of public goods. The standard approach highlights the importance of distortionary taxation and distributional concerns. The new approach neutralizes distributional concerns by adjusting the non-linear income tax, and finds that this reinvigorates the simple Samuelson rule when preferences are separable in goods and leisure. We provide a synthesis by demonstrating that both approaches derive from the same basic formula. We further develop the new approach by deriving a general, intuitive formula for the optimal level of a public good without imposing strong assumptions on preferences. This formula shows that distortionary taxation may have a role to play as in the standard approach. However, the main determinants of optimal provision are completely different and the traditional formula with its emphasis on MCF only obtains in a very special case.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - public good provision

KW - distortionary taxation

KW - distribution

M3 - Working paper

BT - Optimal Provision of Public Goods

CY - Munich

ER -

ID: 17215081