R&D returns, market structure and research joint ventures
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
A two-period symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear demand and costs is analyzed under linear (or more general) returns to scale in process R&D. Subgame-perfect equilibrium may call for one firm to fully innovate while the other firm remains just as before. The outcome is a polar duopoly or monopoly (one firm endogenously exiting). Two research joint venture schemes and the noncooperative solution are compared. Due to built-in symmetry, a joint lab does not always lead to the best performance. Overall, our findings differ quite substantially from those based on strongly decreasing R&D returns and symmetric outcomes
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics |
Vol/bind | 156 |
Udgave nummer | 4 |
Sider (fra-til) | 583-598 |
ISSN | 0932-4569 |
Status | Udgivet - 2000 |
Bibliografisk note
JEL Classification: D43, L13, O30
ID: 148643