R&D returns, market structure and research joint ventures
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R&D returns, market structure and research joint ventures. / Amir, Rabah.
I: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Bind 156, Nr. 4, 2000, s. 583-598.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - R&D returns, market structure and research joint ventures
AU - Amir, Rabah
N1 - JEL Classification: D43, L13, O30
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - A two-period symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear demand and costs is analyzed under linear (or more general) returns to scale in process R&D. Subgame-perfect equilibrium may call for one firm to fully innovate while the other firm remains just as before. The outcome is a polar duopoly or monopoly (one firm endogenously exiting). Two research joint venture schemes and the noncooperative solution are compared. Due to built-in symmetry, a joint lab does not always lead to the best performance. Overall, our findings differ quite substantially from those based on strongly decreasing R&D returns and symmetric outcomes
AB - A two-period symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear demand and costs is analyzed under linear (or more general) returns to scale in process R&D. Subgame-perfect equilibrium may call for one firm to fully innovate while the other firm remains just as before. The outcome is a polar duopoly or monopoly (one firm endogenously exiting). Two research joint venture schemes and the noncooperative solution are compared. Due to built-in symmetry, a joint lab does not always lead to the best performance. Overall, our findings differ quite substantially from those based on strongly decreasing R&D returns and symmetric outcomes
M3 - Journal article
VL - 156
SP - 583
EP - 598
JO - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
SN - 0932-4569
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 148643