Vertical market participation
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Firms that operate at both levels of vertically related Cournot oligopolies will purchase some input supplies from independent rivals, even though they can produce the good at a lower cost, driving up input price for nonintegrated firms at the final good level. Foreclosure, which avoids this strategic behavior, yields better market performance than Cournot beliefs
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Review of Industrial Organization |
Vol/bind | 13 |
Udgave nummer | 3 |
Sider (fra-til) | 321-331 |
ISSN | 0889-938X |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 1998 |
ID: 154840