Vertical market participation

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Standard

Vertical market participation. / Schrader, Alexander; Martin, Stephen.

I: Review of Industrial Organization, Bind 13, Nr. 3, 1998, s. 321-331.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Schrader, A & Martin, S 1998, 'Vertical market participation', Review of Industrial Organization, bind 13, nr. 3, s. 321-331. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007741508413

APA

Schrader, A., & Martin, S. (1998). Vertical market participation. Review of Industrial Organization, 13(3), 321-331. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007741508413

Vancouver

Schrader A, Martin S. Vertical market participation. Review of Industrial Organization. 1998;13(3):321-331. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007741508413

Author

Schrader, Alexander ; Martin, Stephen. / Vertical market participation. I: Review of Industrial Organization. 1998 ; Bind 13, Nr. 3. s. 321-331.

Bibtex

@article{a37545c074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Vertical market participation",
abstract = "Firms that operate at both levels of vertically related Cournot oligopolies will purchase some input supplies from independent rivals, even though they can produce the good at a lower cost, driving up input price for nonintegrated firms at the final good level. Foreclosure, which avoids this strategic behavior, yields better market performance than Cournot beliefs",
author = "Alexander Schrader and Stephen Martin",
year = "1998",
doi = "10.1023/A:1007741508413",
language = "English",
volume = "13",
pages = "321--331",
journal = "Review of Industrial Organization",
issn = "0889-938X",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Vertical market participation

AU - Schrader, Alexander

AU - Martin, Stephen

PY - 1998

Y1 - 1998

N2 - Firms that operate at both levels of vertically related Cournot oligopolies will purchase some input supplies from independent rivals, even though they can produce the good at a lower cost, driving up input price for nonintegrated firms at the final good level. Foreclosure, which avoids this strategic behavior, yields better market performance than Cournot beliefs

AB - Firms that operate at both levels of vertically related Cournot oligopolies will purchase some input supplies from independent rivals, even though they can produce the good at a lower cost, driving up input price for nonintegrated firms at the final good level. Foreclosure, which avoids this strategic behavior, yields better market performance than Cournot beliefs

U2 - 10.1023/A:1007741508413

DO - 10.1023/A:1007741508413

M3 - Journal article

VL - 13

SP - 321

EP - 331

JO - Review of Industrial Organization

JF - Review of Industrial Organization

SN - 0889-938X

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 154840