Vertical market participation
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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Vertical market participation. / Schrader, Alexander; Martin, Stephen.
I: Review of Industrial Organization, Bind 13, Nr. 3, 1998, s. 321-331.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Vertical market participation
AU - Schrader, Alexander
AU - Martin, Stephen
PY - 1998
Y1 - 1998
N2 - Firms that operate at both levels of vertically related Cournot oligopolies will purchase some input supplies from independent rivals, even though they can produce the good at a lower cost, driving up input price for nonintegrated firms at the final good level. Foreclosure, which avoids this strategic behavior, yields better market performance than Cournot beliefs
AB - Firms that operate at both levels of vertically related Cournot oligopolies will purchase some input supplies from independent rivals, even though they can produce the good at a lower cost, driving up input price for nonintegrated firms at the final good level. Foreclosure, which avoids this strategic behavior, yields better market performance than Cournot beliefs
U2 - 10.1023/A:1007741508413
DO - 10.1023/A:1007741508413
M3 - Journal article
VL - 13
SP - 321
EP - 331
JO - Review of Industrial Organization
JF - Review of Industrial Organization
SN - 0889-938X
IS - 3
ER -
ID: 154840