The Motivations of Individual Judges and How They Act as a Group

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskning


States have a significant influence on the selection of judges to international courts. This raises the concern that judges will be biased in favor of their home states, a concern backed by some empirical research. To counter that danger, international courts usually sit in large and diverse panels. Scholars have argued that this gives judges only rare occasions to tip the balance in favor of their home states. The problem begins, however, when judges start forming coalitions among themselves, giving judges with national biases a practical possibility to change the result of cases. To assess the magnitude of this threat to judicial independence, the paper draws on decades of scholarship in the field of judicial behavior. By understanding how judges behave, scholars can come closer to deciphering the true impact of judicial selection to international courts on international judgments.
TidsskriftGerman Law Journal
Udgave nummer7
Sider (fra-til)2165-2188
Antal sider24
StatusUdgivet - 2018

Antal downloads er baseret på statistik fra Google Scholar og

Ingen data tilgængelig

ID: 198110082