The Global Minimum Tax

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Standard

The Global Minimum Tax. / Johannesen, Niels.

I: Journal of Public Economics, Bind 212, 104709, 2022.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Johannesen, N 2022, 'The Global Minimum Tax', Journal of Public Economics, bind 212, 104709. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104709

APA

Johannesen, N. (2022). The Global Minimum Tax. Journal of Public Economics, 212, [104709]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104709

Vancouver

Johannesen N. The Global Minimum Tax. Journal of Public Economics. 2022;212. 104709. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104709

Author

Johannesen, Niels. / The Global Minimum Tax. I: Journal of Public Economics. 2022 ; Bind 212.

Bibtex

@article{4f4a665d0a1840baba5aa8ce1e8a632c,
title = "The Global Minimum Tax",
abstract = "This paper studies how the global minimum tax shapes national tax policies and welfare in a formal model of international tax competition with heterogeneous countries. The net welfare effect is generally ambiguous from the perspective of non-havens. On the one hand, the global minimum tax raises their welfare by curbing profit shifting, which boosts government revenue. One the other hand, it lowers their welfare by increasing equilibrium tax rates in havens, which transfers resources from non-haven firms to haven governments. The net welfare effect is unambiguously positive when the global minimum rate is so high that profit shifting ends.",
author = "Niels Johannesen",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104709",
language = "English",
volume = "212",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Global Minimum Tax

AU - Johannesen, Niels

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - This paper studies how the global minimum tax shapes national tax policies and welfare in a formal model of international tax competition with heterogeneous countries. The net welfare effect is generally ambiguous from the perspective of non-havens. On the one hand, the global minimum tax raises their welfare by curbing profit shifting, which boosts government revenue. One the other hand, it lowers their welfare by increasing equilibrium tax rates in havens, which transfers resources from non-haven firms to haven governments. The net welfare effect is unambiguously positive when the global minimum rate is so high that profit shifting ends.

AB - This paper studies how the global minimum tax shapes national tax policies and welfare in a formal model of international tax competition with heterogeneous countries. The net welfare effect is generally ambiguous from the perspective of non-havens. On the one hand, the global minimum tax raises their welfare by curbing profit shifting, which boosts government revenue. One the other hand, it lowers their welfare by increasing equilibrium tax rates in havens, which transfers resources from non-haven firms to haven governments. The net welfare effect is unambiguously positive when the global minimum rate is so high that profit shifting ends.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104709

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104709

M3 - Journal article

VL - 212

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

M1 - 104709

ER -

ID: 336939660