Seeing what I am doing
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- Grunbaum_Seeing what I am doing_PPR2013
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I argue against the view that an agent’s knowledge of her own current action cannot in any way rely on perception for its justification. Instead, I argue that when it comes to an agent’s knowledge of her own object-oriented intentional action, the agent’s belief about what she is doing is partly justified by her perception of the object of action. I proceed by first proposing an account of such actions according to which the agent’s knowledge is partly justified by her perception. I then discuss several of objections to my proposal. The most important objection is that I have only managed to show that perception plays an enabling role and not a justificatory role for the agent’s knowledge of her own intentional action
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
---|---|
Tidsskrift | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
Vol/bind | 86 |
Udgave nummer | 2 |
Sider (fra-til) | 295-318 |
Antal sider | 24 |
ISSN | 0031-8205 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2013 |
- Det Humanistiske Fakultet - philosophy of action, intention, knowledge of Action, demonstratives, attention
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