The concept of personal autonomy in contemporary moral and political philosophy is broadly associated with an agent's self-determining or self-governing capacities. However, scholars have long criticized the tendency in philosophy to idealize autonomy in an overtly atomistic and asocial manner, for example by assuming that autonomous individuals are totally independent decision-makers unaffected by interpersonal ties. Feminist philosophers especially have developed ‘relational’ approaches to autonomy in attempt to reconfigure this individualistic tradition in ways that are amenable to social considerations. Relational autonomy accounts are now known for espousing a more socially informed version of human agency. Such frameworks recognize that the very making of the autonomous self must involve some degree of socialization, for instance, or that certain subordinating social phenomena like oppression might problematically influence one's otherwise autonomous beliefs, preferences, and so forth.

There remains much theoretical variation, however, in the range of relational accounts which have thus far been proposed. My Philosophy Compass article endeavours to highlight and organize some of the major points of disagreement between relational theories, covering distinctions commonly invoked in the debate. Despite the heterogeneity of relational autonomy theories, I also emphasize the ways that relational autonomy-theorizing makes for a challenging but valuable contribution to philosophy.