Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice. / Lee, J. Y.

In: Social Epistemology, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2021, p. 564-576 .

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Lee, JY 2021, 'Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice', Social Epistemology, vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 564-576 . https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2021.1924306

APA

Lee, J. Y. (2021). Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice. Social Epistemology, 35(6), 564-576 . https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2021.1924306

Vancouver

Lee JY. Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice. Social Epistemology. 2021;35(6):564-576 . https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2021.1924306

Author

Lee, J. Y. / Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice. In: Social Epistemology. 2021 ; Vol. 35, No. 6. pp. 564-576 .

Bibtex

@article{2262fb8a8ae9447c994bee6dd2e85f04,
title = "Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice",
abstract = "Epistemic injustices are wrongs that agents can suffer in their capacity as knowers. In this article, I offer a conceptualisation of a phenomenon I call anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I claim is a distinct and particularly pernicious type of epistemic injustice worthy of independent analysis. I take anticipatory epistemic injustice to consist in the wrongs that agents can suffer as a result of anticipated challenges in their process of taking up testimony-sharing opportunities. I distinguish my account from paradigmatic cases of epistemic injustice, such as Miranda Fricker's concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice; additionally, I differentiate my view from Kristie Dotson's account of testimonial smothering. I argue, ultimately, that anticipatory epistemic injustice is a useful addition to our current taxonomy of epistemic injustices, as it has promising explanatory potential for a range of non-standard cases of epistemic injustice.",
keywords = "Epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice, self-silencing, testimonial smothering",
author = "Lee, {J. Y.}",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1080/02691728.2021.1924306",
language = "English",
volume = "35",
pages = "564--576 ",
journal = "Social Epistemology",
issn = "0269-1728",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice

AU - Lee, J. Y.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - Epistemic injustices are wrongs that agents can suffer in their capacity as knowers. In this article, I offer a conceptualisation of a phenomenon I call anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I claim is a distinct and particularly pernicious type of epistemic injustice worthy of independent analysis. I take anticipatory epistemic injustice to consist in the wrongs that agents can suffer as a result of anticipated challenges in their process of taking up testimony-sharing opportunities. I distinguish my account from paradigmatic cases of epistemic injustice, such as Miranda Fricker's concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice; additionally, I differentiate my view from Kristie Dotson's account of testimonial smothering. I argue, ultimately, that anticipatory epistemic injustice is a useful addition to our current taxonomy of epistemic injustices, as it has promising explanatory potential for a range of non-standard cases of epistemic injustice.

AB - Epistemic injustices are wrongs that agents can suffer in their capacity as knowers. In this article, I offer a conceptualisation of a phenomenon I call anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I claim is a distinct and particularly pernicious type of epistemic injustice worthy of independent analysis. I take anticipatory epistemic injustice to consist in the wrongs that agents can suffer as a result of anticipated challenges in their process of taking up testimony-sharing opportunities. I distinguish my account from paradigmatic cases of epistemic injustice, such as Miranda Fricker's concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice; additionally, I differentiate my view from Kristie Dotson's account of testimonial smothering. I argue, ultimately, that anticipatory epistemic injustice is a useful addition to our current taxonomy of epistemic injustices, as it has promising explanatory potential for a range of non-standard cases of epistemic injustice.

KW - Epistemic injustice

KW - testimonial injustice

KW - self-silencing

KW - testimonial smothering

U2 - 10.1080/02691728.2021.1924306

DO - 10.1080/02691728.2021.1924306

M3 - Journal article

VL - 35

SP - 564

EP - 576

JO - Social Epistemology

JF - Social Epistemology

SN - 0269-1728

IS - 6

ER -

ID: 270542779