Aktive og passive valg i pensionsopsparingen
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This paper reviews two papers from my own research. I show that the effect of pension policies are highly dependent on which type of decision maker the policy targets. Specifically, the effectiveness of the policy is stronger if it affects passive choice. Such policies, e.g., employer pensions, are extremely effective in increasing total individual savings. Tax deductions on the other hand are ineffective. The reason is that an estimated 85 % of the population are passive savers, who do not respond to changes in policies. Consequently, an increased labor market pension rate will also make their total savings increase. The remaining 15 % are active savers, who respond to policy changes by reshuffling their savings portfolios, which effectively leaves their total savings unchanged. Finally, I show that tax incentives affect the individuals’ savings through their employers, because they tend to incorporate the employees’ preferences.
|Status||Udgivet - 2017|
- Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet - Pensionsopsparing, aktive og passive valg, obligatoriske ordninger, skattesubsidier, H2, H3, D14, J32