Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
Standard
Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games : Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets. / Albæk, Svend; Overgaard, P. Baltzer.
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1994.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
Harvard
Albæk, S & Overgaard, PB 1994 'Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
APA
Albæk, S., & Overgaard, P. B. (1994). Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Vancouver
Albæk S, Overgaard PB. Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 1994.
Author
Bibtex
@techreport{0ff770b074c711dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games: Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets",
author = "Svend Alb{\ae}k and Overgaard, {P. Baltzer}",
year = "1994",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
}
RIS
TY - UNPB
T1 - Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games
T2 - Finite Response Sets vs. Continuum Response Sets
AU - Albæk, Svend
AU - Overgaard, P. Baltzer
PY - 1994
Y1 - 1994
M3 - Working paper
BT - Uniqueness in Two-type Signalling Games
PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
ER -
ID: 161829