The Problem of Probability: An Examination and Refutation of Hjørland’s Relevance Equation
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The Problem of Probability: An Examination and Refutation of Hjørland’s Relevance Equation. / Nicolaisen, Jeppe.
I: Information Research, Bind 22, Nr. 1, 2017.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Konferenceartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - GEN
T1 - The Problem of Probability: An Examination and Refutation of Hjørland’s Relevance Equation
AU - Nicolaisen, Jeppe
N1 - Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Conceptions of Library and Information Science, Uppsala, Sweden, June 27-29, 2016
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - Introduction. The paper presents a critical examination of Professor Birger Hjørland’s relevance equation: Something (A) is relevant to a task (T) if it increases the likelihood of accomplishing the goal (G), which is implied by T. Method. Two theories of probability logic (the logical theory and the intersubjective theory) are briefly reviewed and then applied to Hjørland’s equation. Analysis. Focusing on how these theories warrant the probability assumption makes it possible to detect deficiencies in Hjørland’s equation, based as it is on probability logic. Results. Regardless of the kind of logic applied to warrant the probability assumption of Hjørland’s equation, the outcome of using it to determine the relevance of any A to any T is found to have quite bizarre consequences: Either nothing is relevant or everything is relevant. Conclusion. Contrary to Hjørland’s claim that his relevance equation applies to anything (including documents, ideas, meanings, texts, theories, and things), it is found at best to have very limited generalisability.
AB - Introduction. The paper presents a critical examination of Professor Birger Hjørland’s relevance equation: Something (A) is relevant to a task (T) if it increases the likelihood of accomplishing the goal (G), which is implied by T. Method. Two theories of probability logic (the logical theory and the intersubjective theory) are briefly reviewed and then applied to Hjørland’s equation. Analysis. Focusing on how these theories warrant the probability assumption makes it possible to detect deficiencies in Hjørland’s equation, based as it is on probability logic. Results. Regardless of the kind of logic applied to warrant the probability assumption of Hjørland’s equation, the outcome of using it to determine the relevance of any A to any T is found to have quite bizarre consequences: Either nothing is relevant or everything is relevant. Conclusion. Contrary to Hjørland’s claim that his relevance equation applies to anything (including documents, ideas, meanings, texts, theories, and things), it is found at best to have very limited generalisability.
M3 - Conference article
VL - 22
JO - Information Research
JF - Information Research
SN - 1368-1613
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 174695500