The origins of governments: From anarchy to hierarchy
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Standard
The origins of governments : From anarchy to hierarchy. / Baker, Matthew; Bulte, Erwin; Weisdorf, Jacob Louis.
I: Journal of Institutional Economics, Bind 6, Nr. 2, 2010, s. 215-242.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - The origins of governments
T2 - From anarchy to hierarchy
AU - Baker, Matthew
AU - Bulte, Erwin
AU - Weisdorf, Jacob Louis
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally ‘switch' from anarchy to hierarchy - when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be ‘trapped' at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions.
AB - We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally ‘switch' from anarchy to hierarchy - when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be ‘trapped' at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions.
U2 - 10.1017/S1744137409990336
DO - 10.1017/S1744137409990336
M3 - Journal article
VL - 6
SP - 215
EP - 242
JO - Journal of Institutional Economics
JF - Journal of Institutional Economics
SN - 1744-1374
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 18455108