Norm shifts under the strategy method

Forskning

Norm shifts under the strategy method

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Norm shifts under the strategy method. / Columbus, Simon; Böhm, Robert.

I: Judgment and Decision Making, Bind 16, Nr. 5, 09.2021, s. 1267-1289.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Columbus, S & Böhm, R 2021, 'Norm shifts under the strategy method', Judgment and Decision Making, bind 16, nr. 5, s. 1267-1289. <http://journal.sjdm.org/21/210609b/jdm210609b.pdf>

APA

Columbus, S., & Böhm, R. (2021). Norm shifts under the strategy method. Judgment and Decision Making, 16(5), 1267-1289. http://journal.sjdm.org/21/210609b/jdm210609b.pdf

Vancouver

Columbus S, Böhm R. Norm shifts under the strategy method. Judgment and Decision Making. 2021 sep.;16(5):1267-1289.

Author

Columbus, Simon ; Böhm, Robert. / Norm shifts under the strategy method. I: Judgment and Decision Making. 2021 ; Bind 16, Nr. 5. s. 1267-1289.

Bibtex

@article{a619a58e96c14329850564d4b722a3f8,

title = "Norm shifts under the strategy method",

abstract = "The strategy method is a powerful method for eliciting conditional cooperation in strategic interactions. Theoretically, players{\textquoteright} cooperation conditional on a specific level of others{\textquoteright} cooperation using the strategy method should be equal to their unconditional cooperation given an equivalent belief about others{\textquoteright} cooperation. However, using the Prisoner{\textquoteright}s Dilemma, we show that decisions using the strategy method are more selfish than decisions under a simultaneous decision protocol predicted from players{\textquoteright} beliefs. This is driven entirely by lower cooperation among conditional cooperators with low expectations about others{\textquoteright} cooperation. We further show that relative to simultaneous choice, the strategy method shifts salient norms from an egalitarian fairness norm ({\textquoteleft}give half{\textquoteright}) to a reciprocity norm ({\textquoteleft}match others{\textquoteright} behaviour{\textquoteright}). This undermines cooperation among players with low beliefs about others{\textquoteright} cooperation. These results thus show that the strategy method does not merely hold beliefs constant, but also shifts which salient norms influence choice behaviour. This has important implications for the use of the strategy method in eliciting social preferences.",

keywords = "Cooperation, Prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilemma, Social norms, Social preferences, Strategy method",

author = "Simon Columbus and Robert B{\"o}hm",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021.",

year = "2021",

month = sep,

language = "English",

volume = "16",

pages = "1267--1289",

journal = "Judgment and Decision Making",

issn = "1930-2975",

publisher = "Society for Judgment and Decision Making",

number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Norm shifts under the strategy method

AU - Columbus, Simon

AU - Böhm, Robert

PY - 2021/9

Y1 - 2021/9

N2 - The strategy method is a powerful method for eliciting conditional cooperation in strategic interactions. Theoretically, players’ cooperation conditional on a specific level of others’ cooperation using the strategy method should be equal to their unconditional cooperation given an equivalent belief about others’ cooperation. However, using the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we show that decisions using the strategy method are more selfish than decisions under a simultaneous decision protocol predicted from players’ beliefs. This is driven entirely by lower cooperation among conditional cooperators with low expectations about others’ cooperation. We further show that relative to simultaneous choice, the strategy method shifts salient norms from an egalitarian fairness norm (‘give half’) to a reciprocity norm (‘match others’ behaviour’). This undermines cooperation among players with low beliefs about others’ cooperation. These results thus show that the strategy method does not merely hold beliefs constant, but also shifts which salient norms influence choice behaviour. This has important implications for the use of the strategy method in eliciting social preferences.

AB - The strategy method is a powerful method for eliciting conditional cooperation in strategic interactions. Theoretically, players’ cooperation conditional on a specific level of others’ cooperation using the strategy method should be equal to their unconditional cooperation given an equivalent belief about others’ cooperation. However, using the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we show that decisions using the strategy method are more selfish than decisions under a simultaneous decision protocol predicted from players’ beliefs. This is driven entirely by lower cooperation among conditional cooperators with low expectations about others’ cooperation. We further show that relative to simultaneous choice, the strategy method shifts salient norms from an egalitarian fairness norm (‘give half’) to a reciprocity norm (‘match others’ behaviour’). This undermines cooperation among players with low beliefs about others’ cooperation. These results thus show that the strategy method does not merely hold beliefs constant, but also shifts which salient norms influence choice behaviour. This has important implications for the use of the strategy method in eliciting social preferences.

KW - Cooperation

KW - Prisoner’s dilemma

KW - Social norms

KW - Social preferences

KW - Strategy method

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85116252679&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85116252679

VL - 16

SP - 1267

EP - 1289

JO - Judgment and Decision Making

JF - Judgment and Decision Making

SN - 1930-2975

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 294807418