TY - JOUR

T1 - 'Going to The Hague' as Coercive Leverage

T2 - The Palestinian ICC Policy during the 2014 Operation Protective Edge

AU - Schack, Marc

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - During the summer of 2014, Israel initiated a major air and land offensive against the Gaza strip (Operation ‘Protective Edge’). Palestine responded by engaging in a set of what can be termed ‘coercive policies’, using the threat of activating the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as leverage. This was the first time in history that an international actor used a possible recourse to the Court in such an explicitly coercive manner. Hence, this case enables us to conduct some preliminary analyses of this strategy’s effectiveness. Specifically, Palestine tried first to stop the Israeli offensive itself and later, after combat operations had ended, to compel the United Nations (UN) Security Council to demand an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967-borders. Palestine’s policies, however, did not succeed. Its threats did not secure an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, nor did they compel the UN Security Council to pass a resolution demanding Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967-borders. The present article argues that, most likely, this lack of result was due to a flawed Palestinian policy, conceived and employed in a very difficult situation. Specifically, it is argued that the Palestinian demands were too ambitious when compared to the actual coercive potential of ICC involvement, and that they did not manage to articulate a sufficiently credible and consistent coercive message. The article concludes that the outcome of the Palestinian strategy is therefore likely due more to these shortcomings than to an inherent lack of coercive potential of the ICC.

AB - During the summer of 2014, Israel initiated a major air and land offensive against the Gaza strip (Operation ‘Protective Edge’). Palestine responded by engaging in a set of what can be termed ‘coercive policies’, using the threat of activating the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as leverage. This was the first time in history that an international actor used a possible recourse to the Court in such an explicitly coercive manner. Hence, this case enables us to conduct some preliminary analyses of this strategy’s effectiveness. Specifically, Palestine tried first to stop the Israeli offensive itself and later, after combat operations had ended, to compel the United Nations (UN) Security Council to demand an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967-borders. Palestine’s policies, however, did not succeed. Its threats did not secure an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, nor did they compel the UN Security Council to pass a resolution demanding Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967-borders. The present article argues that, most likely, this lack of result was due to a flawed Palestinian policy, conceived and employed in a very difficult situation. Specifically, it is argued that the Palestinian demands were too ambitious when compared to the actual coercive potential of ICC involvement, and that they did not manage to articulate a sufficiently credible and consistent coercive message. The article concludes that the outcome of the Palestinian strategy is therefore likely due more to these shortcomings than to an inherent lack of coercive potential of the ICC.

U2 - 10.1093/jicj/mqw075

DO - 10.1093/jicj/mqw075

M3 - Journal article

VL - 15

JO - Journal of International Criminal Justice

JF - Journal of International Criminal Justice

SN - 1478-1387

IS - 2

ER -