Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice
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Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice. / Lee, J. Y.
In: Social Epistemology, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2021, p. 564-576 .Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice
AU - Lee, J. Y.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Epistemic injustices are wrongs that agents can suffer in their capacity as knowers. In this article, I offer a conceptualisation of a phenomenon I call anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I claim is a distinct and particularly pernicious type of epistemic injustice worthy of independent analysis. I take anticipatory epistemic injustice to consist in the wrongs that agents can suffer as a result of anticipated challenges in their process of taking up testimony-sharing opportunities. I distinguish my account from paradigmatic cases of epistemic injustice, such as Miranda Fricker's concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice; additionally, I differentiate my view from Kristie Dotson's account of testimonial smothering. I argue, ultimately, that anticipatory epistemic injustice is a useful addition to our current taxonomy of epistemic injustices, as it has promising explanatory potential for a range of non-standard cases of epistemic injustice.
AB - Epistemic injustices are wrongs that agents can suffer in their capacity as knowers. In this article, I offer a conceptualisation of a phenomenon I call anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I claim is a distinct and particularly pernicious type of epistemic injustice worthy of independent analysis. I take anticipatory epistemic injustice to consist in the wrongs that agents can suffer as a result of anticipated challenges in their process of taking up testimony-sharing opportunities. I distinguish my account from paradigmatic cases of epistemic injustice, such as Miranda Fricker's concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice; additionally, I differentiate my view from Kristie Dotson's account of testimonial smothering. I argue, ultimately, that anticipatory epistemic injustice is a useful addition to our current taxonomy of epistemic injustices, as it has promising explanatory potential for a range of non-standard cases of epistemic injustice.
KW - Epistemic injustice
KW - testimonial injustice
KW - self-silencing
KW - testimonial smothering
U2 - 10.1080/02691728.2021.1924306
DO - 10.1080/02691728.2021.1924306
M3 - Journal article
VL - 35
SP - 564
EP - 576
JO - Social Epistemology
JF - Social Epistemology
SN - 0269-1728
IS - 6
ER -
ID: 270542779