A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Standard
A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics. / Jaksland, Rasmus.
In: Ratio, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2023, p. 1-10.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - A trilemma for naturalized metaphysics
AU - Jaksland, Rasmus
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022 The Author. Ratio published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Radical naturalized metaphysics wants to argue (1) that metaphysics without sufficient epistemic warrant should not be pursued, (2) that the traditional methods of metaphysics cannot provide epistemic warrant, (3) that metaphysics using these methods must therefore be discontinued, and (4) that naturalized metaphysics should be pursued instead since (5) such science-based metaphysics succeeds in establishing justified conclusions about ultimate reality. This paper argues that to defend (5), naturalized metaphysics must rely on methods similar to those criticized in (2). If naturalized metaphysics instead opts for the weaker claim that science-based metaphysics is only superior to other metaphysics, then this is insufficient to establish (4). In this case, (4) might therefore be defeated by (1). An alternative is to replace (1) with the view that we should just approach metaphysical questions with the best means available. While this would recommend a science-based approach whenever possible, it would also allow for the continuation of science-independent metaphysics in domains that science has no bearing on and thus reject (3). The paper concludes that none of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory for naturalized metaphysics.
AB - Radical naturalized metaphysics wants to argue (1) that metaphysics without sufficient epistemic warrant should not be pursued, (2) that the traditional methods of metaphysics cannot provide epistemic warrant, (3) that metaphysics using these methods must therefore be discontinued, and (4) that naturalized metaphysics should be pursued instead since (5) such science-based metaphysics succeeds in establishing justified conclusions about ultimate reality. This paper argues that to defend (5), naturalized metaphysics must rely on methods similar to those criticized in (2). If naturalized metaphysics instead opts for the weaker claim that science-based metaphysics is only superior to other metaphysics, then this is insufficient to establish (4). In this case, (4) might therefore be defeated by (1). An alternative is to replace (1) with the view that we should just approach metaphysical questions with the best means available. While this would recommend a science-based approach whenever possible, it would also allow for the continuation of science-independent metaphysics in domains that science has no bearing on and thus reject (3). The paper concludes that none of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory for naturalized metaphysics.
KW - epistemic risk
KW - metametaphysics
KW - naturalism
KW - naturalized metaphysics
KW - philosophy of science
U2 - 10.1111/rati.12344
DO - 10.1111/rati.12344
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85133122028
VL - 36
SP - 1
EP - 10
JO - Ratio
JF - Ratio
SN - 0034-0006
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 339998074