Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers

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Standard

Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers. / Tranæs, Torben; Hendon, Ebbe.

I: Games and Economic Behavior, Bind 3, Nr. 4, 1991, s. 453-466.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Tranæs, T & Hendon, E 1991, 'Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers', Games and Economic Behavior, bind 3, nr. 4, s. 453-466. https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7

APA

Tranæs, T., & Hendon, E. (1991). Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers. Games and Economic Behavior, 3(4), 453-466. https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7

Vancouver

Tranæs T, Hendon E. Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers. Games and Economic Behavior. 1991;3(4):453-466. https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7

Author

Tranæs, Torben ; Hendon, Ebbe. / Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers. I: Games and Economic Behavior. 1991 ; Bind 3, Nr. 4. s. 453-466.

Bibtex

@article{dee52f3074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers",
abstract = "A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. We demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. We investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium",
author = "Torben Tran{\ae}s and Ebbe Hendon",
year = "1991",
doi = "10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7",
language = "English",
volume = "3",
pages = "453--466",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers

AU - Tranæs, Torben

AU - Hendon, Ebbe

PY - 1991

Y1 - 1991

N2 - A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. We demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. We investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium

AB - A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. We demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. We investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium

U2 - 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7

DO - 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7

M3 - Journal article

VL - 3

SP - 453

EP - 466

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 158358