Monetary Exchange with Multilateral Matching
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Monetary Exchange with Multilateral Matching. / Julien, Benoît; Kennes, John; King, Ian.
Cph. : Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2005.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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RIS
TY - UNPB
T1 - Monetary Exchange with Multilateral Matching
AU - Julien, Benoît
AU - Kennes, John
AU - King, Ian
N1 - JEL Classification: C78, D44, E40
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - This paper analyzes monetary exchange in a search model allowing for multilateral matches to be formed, according to a standard urn-ballprocess. We consider three physical environments: indivisible goods and money, divisible goods and indivisible money, and divisible goods and money. We compare the results with Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Trejos and Wright (1995), and Lagos and Wright (2005) respectively. We find that the multilateral matching setting generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those in the other papers, but which have important differences. In particular, surplus maximization can be achieved in this setting, in equilibrium, with a positive money supply. Moreover, with flexible prices and directed search, the first best allocation can be attained through price posting or through auctions with lotteries, but not through auctions without lotteries. Finally, analysis of the case of divisible goods and money can be performed without the assumption of large families (as in Shi (1997)) or the day and night structure of Lagos and Wright (2005).
AB - This paper analyzes monetary exchange in a search model allowing for multilateral matches to be formed, according to a standard urn-ballprocess. We consider three physical environments: indivisible goods and money, divisible goods and indivisible money, and divisible goods and money. We compare the results with Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Trejos and Wright (1995), and Lagos and Wright (2005) respectively. We find that the multilateral matching setting generates very simple and intuitive equilibrium allocations that are similar to those in the other papers, but which have important differences. In particular, surplus maximization can be achieved in this setting, in equilibrium, with a positive money supply. Moreover, with flexible prices and directed search, the first best allocation can be attained through price posting or through auctions with lotteries, but not through auctions without lotteries. Finally, analysis of the case of divisible goods and money can be performed without the assumption of large families (as in Shi (1997)) or the day and night structure of Lagos and Wright (2005).
M3 - Working paper
BT - Monetary Exchange with Multilateral Matching
PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
CY - Cph.
ER -
ID: 159083