The origins of governments: From anarchy to hierarchy

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Standard

The origins of governments : From anarchy to hierarchy. / Baker, Matthew; Bulte, Erwin; Weisdorf, Jacob Louis.

I: Journal of Institutional Economics, Bind 6, Nr. 2, 2010, s. 215-242.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Baker, M, Bulte, E & Weisdorf, JL 2010, 'The origins of governments: From anarchy to hierarchy', Journal of Institutional Economics, bind 6, nr. 2, s. 215-242. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137409990336

APA

Baker, M., Bulte, E., & Weisdorf, J. L. (2010). The origins of governments: From anarchy to hierarchy. Journal of Institutional Economics, 6(2), 215-242. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137409990336

Vancouver

Baker M, Bulte E, Weisdorf JL. The origins of governments: From anarchy to hierarchy. Journal of Institutional Economics. 2010;6(2):215-242. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137409990336

Author

Baker, Matthew ; Bulte, Erwin ; Weisdorf, Jacob Louis. / The origins of governments : From anarchy to hierarchy. I: Journal of Institutional Economics. 2010 ; Bind 6, Nr. 2. s. 215-242.

Bibtex

@article{92043c102ac111df8ed1000ea68e967b,
title = "The origins of governments: From anarchy to hierarchy",
abstract = "We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally {\textquoteleft}switch' from anarchy to hierarchy - when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be {\textquoteleft}trapped' at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions.",
author = "Matthew Baker and Erwin Bulte and Weisdorf, {Jacob Louis}",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1017/S1744137409990336",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = "215--242",
journal = "Journal of Institutional Economics",
issn = "1744-1374",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The origins of governments

T2 - From anarchy to hierarchy

AU - Baker, Matthew

AU - Bulte, Erwin

AU - Weisdorf, Jacob Louis

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally ‘switch' from anarchy to hierarchy - when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be ‘trapped' at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions.

AB - We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally ‘switch' from anarchy to hierarchy - when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be ‘trapped' at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions.

U2 - 10.1017/S1744137409990336

DO - 10.1017/S1744137409990336

M3 - Journal article

VL - 6

SP - 215

EP - 242

JO - Journal of Institutional Economics

JF - Journal of Institutional Economics

SN - 1744-1374

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 18455108