The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis
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The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis. / Hougaard, Jens Leth; Jensen, Frank; Smilgins, Aleksandrs.
I: Strategic Behavior and the Environment, Bind 8, Nr. 2, 2020, s. 169-218.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis
AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth
AU - Jensen, Frank
AU - Smilgins, Aleksandrs
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - From 2010 and onwards, a crisis has occurred over the distribution of a yearly total allowable catch (TAC) for the mackerel fishery in the Northeast Atlantic Sea. The European Union (the EU), Norway (NO), Iceland (IC) and the Faroe Islands (the FI) are players in this "mackerel crisis". In the present study, we use game theory in an attempt to rationalize the actual behaviour of these players during the mackerel crisis. We identify the profit of each possible coalition structure (the coalitional values) by using a fisheries economic model, and quantify the coalitional values empirically by statistical estimation of the relevant functional relationships. Based on the statistical estimations, we define a benchmark scenario and conduct a number of sensitivity analyses. To try to rationalize the outcome during the mackerel crisis, we require that a relevant coalition must be internally stable in the sense that no structure has an incentive to split up. By using the notion of internal stability, we are partly able to rationalize the actual coalition formation during the mackerel crisis.
AB - From 2010 and onwards, a crisis has occurred over the distribution of a yearly total allowable catch (TAC) for the mackerel fishery in the Northeast Atlantic Sea. The European Union (the EU), Norway (NO), Iceland (IC) and the Faroe Islands (the FI) are players in this "mackerel crisis". In the present study, we use game theory in an attempt to rationalize the actual behaviour of these players during the mackerel crisis. We identify the profit of each possible coalition structure (the coalitional values) by using a fisheries economic model, and quantify the coalitional values empirically by statistical estimation of the relevant functional relationships. Based on the statistical estimations, we define a benchmark scenario and conduct a number of sensitivity analyses. To try to rationalize the outcome during the mackerel crisis, we require that a relevant coalition must be internally stable in the sense that no structure has an incentive to split up. By using the notion of internal stability, we are partly able to rationalize the actual coalition formation during the mackerel crisis.
U2 - 10.1561/102.00000092
DO - 10.1561/102.00000092
M3 - Journal article
VL - 8
SP - 169
EP - 218
JO - Strategic Behavior and the Environment
JF - Strategic Behavior and the Environment
SN - 1944-012X
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 239917327