The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence from the American States
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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The Causes of Fiscal Transparency : Evidence from the American States. / Alt, James E.; Lassen, David Dreyer; Rose, Shanna.
Cph. : Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2006.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - The Causes of Fiscal Transparency
T2 - Evidence from the American States
AU - Alt, James E.
AU - Lassen, David Dreyer
AU - Rose, Shanna
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - We use unique panel data on the evolution of transparent budget procedures in the American states over the past three decades to explore the political and economic determinants of fiscal transparency. Our case studies and quantitative analysis suggest that both politics and fiscal policy outcomes influence the level of transparency. More equal political competition and power sharing are associated with both greater levels of fiscal transparency and increases in fiscal transparency during the sample period. Political polarization and past fiscal conditions, in particular state government debt and budget imbalance, also appear to affect the level of transparency
AB - We use unique panel data on the evolution of transparent budget procedures in the American states over the past three decades to explore the political and economic determinants of fiscal transparency. Our case studies and quantitative analysis suggest that both politics and fiscal policy outcomes influence the level of transparency. More equal political competition and power sharing are associated with both greater levels of fiscal transparency and increases in fiscal transparency during the sample period. Political polarization and past fiscal conditions, in particular state government debt and budget imbalance, also appear to affect the level of transparency
M3 - Working paper
BT - The Causes of Fiscal Transparency
PB - Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
CY - Cph.
ER -
ID: 324541