Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers
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Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers. / Tranæs, Torben; Hendon, Ebbe.
I: Games and Economic Behavior, Bind 3, Nr. 4, 1991, s. 453-466.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers
AU - Tranæs, Torben
AU - Hendon, Ebbe
PY - 1991
Y1 - 1991
N2 - A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. We demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. We investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium
AB - A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. We demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. We investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium
U2 - 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7
DO - 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90015-7
M3 - Journal article
VL - 3
SP - 453
EP - 466
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 158358