Praetorius, N. (2007) The Problems of Consciousness and Content in Theories of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6:349-367
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- Perception
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The paper aims to show, first, that O’Regan’s and Noë’s SensorimotorTheory of Vision and Visual Experiences suffers from circularity, and that evidencefrom empirical research within perception psychology unequivocally invalidatestheir theory. Secondly, to show that the circularity in O’Regan’s and Noë’s theory ofvision and in other general causal and functional theories of perception (i.e. Gibson’sand Marr’s theories of perception) is the inevitable consequence of mutuallyconflicting assumption of Cartesian dualism underlying these theories. The paperconcludes by outlining the consequences of this conflict of assumptions forpsychological theories of perception.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
---|---|
Tidsskrift | Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences |
Vol/bind | 6 |
Sider (fra-til) | 349-367 |
ISSN | 1568-7759 |
Status | Udgivet - 2007 |
- Det Humanistiske Fakultet
Forskningsområder
ID: 224202449