Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion
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Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion. / Overgaard, Søren.
I: Analytic Philosophy, Bind 63, Nr. 3, 2022, s. 174-191.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion
AU - Overgaard, Søren
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - As standardly conceived, an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Such a conflict only obtains in cases where a non-F object appears to be F—appears F in a ‘committal’ way, as I put it. It is, however, possible for an object to appear F in a non-committal way—i.e. without appearing to be F. The paper discusses a number of recent naïve realist attempts to account for illusion. Drawing on the distinction between committal and non-committal appearances, I argue that none of the proposals is able to account for illusion as standardly conceived.
AB - As standardly conceived, an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Such a conflict only obtains in cases where a non-F object appears to be F—appears F in a ‘committal’ way, as I put it. It is, however, possible for an object to appear F in a non-committal way—i.e. without appearing to be F. The paper discusses a number of recent naïve realist attempts to account for illusion. Drawing on the distinction between committal and non-committal appearances, I argue that none of the proposals is able to account for illusion as standardly conceived.
U2 - 10.1111/phib.12230
DO - 10.1111/phib.12230
M3 - Journal article
VL - 63
SP - 174
EP - 191
JO - Analytic Philosophy
JF - Analytic Philosophy
SN - 2153-9596
IS - 3
ER -
ID: 260542589