Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation
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Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation. / Bennedsen, Morten; Huang, Sterling; Wagner, Hannes F.; Zeume, Stefan.
I: The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Bind 8, Nr. 2, 21.06.2019, s. 348-379.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation
AU - Bennedsen, Morten
AU - Huang, Sterling
AU - Wagner, Hannes F.
AU - Zeume, Stefan
PY - 2019/6/21
Y1 - 2019/6/21
N2 - In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms' performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms.
AB - In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms' performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms.
U2 - 10.1093/rcfs/cfz005
DO - 10.1093/rcfs/cfz005
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85071494787
VL - 8
SP - 348
EP - 379
JO - Review of Corporate Finance Studies
JF - Review of Corporate Finance Studies
SN - 2046-9128
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 241594463