EU Judicial Independence Dencentralized: A.K. Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. and others v. Sąd Najwyższy (the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court), Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 19 November 2019, EU:C:2019:982
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EU Judicial Independence Dencentralized: A.K. Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. and others v. Sąd Najwyższy (the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court), Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 19 November 2019, EU:C:2019:982. / Krajewski, Michal; Ziółkowski, Michał.
I: Common Market Law Review, Bind 57, Nr. 4, 01.08.2020, s. 1107-1138.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - EU Judicial Independence Dencentralized: A.K.
T2 - Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. and others v. Sąd Najwyższy (the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court), Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 19 November 2019, EU:C:2019:982
AU - Krajewski, Michal
AU - Ziółkowski, Michał
PY - 2020/8/1
Y1 - 2020/8/1
N2 - The judgment in A.K. and others v. Sad Najwyższy was eagerly awaited as another red line for the EU rule of law. It provided a test for assessing the independence of national courts in their capacity as EU courts. In contrast to a bold stance by the Advocate General, the ECJ demonstrated sensible self-restraint. It did not prescribe ready-made institutional solutions aimed at securing judicial independence. It thus avoided the risk of a judge-made harmonization of domestic judicial organization based on scant and indeterminate Treaty provisions on the matter. Under the ECJ’s test, the referring court was to weigh and compare the relevance of legal and factual circumstances that enhance or impair the public appearance of independence of the brand new Supreme Court Disciplinary Chamber. At the same time, the ECJ shouldered the referring court with a difficult task to make a discretionary assessment of the anti-constitutional legislation altering the judicial organization in Poland – the task that the Supreme Court’s extended formation subsequently delegated to the rank-and-file judges of lower courts.
AB - The judgment in A.K. and others v. Sad Najwyższy was eagerly awaited as another red line for the EU rule of law. It provided a test for assessing the independence of national courts in their capacity as EU courts. In contrast to a bold stance by the Advocate General, the ECJ demonstrated sensible self-restraint. It did not prescribe ready-made institutional solutions aimed at securing judicial independence. It thus avoided the risk of a judge-made harmonization of domestic judicial organization based on scant and indeterminate Treaty provisions on the matter. Under the ECJ’s test, the referring court was to weigh and compare the relevance of legal and factual circumstances that enhance or impair the public appearance of independence of the brand new Supreme Court Disciplinary Chamber. At the same time, the ECJ shouldered the referring court with a difficult task to make a discretionary assessment of the anti-constitutional legislation altering the judicial organization in Poland – the task that the Supreme Court’s extended formation subsequently delegated to the rank-and-file judges of lower courts.
KW - Faculty of Law
KW - Court of Justice of the European Union
KW - Judicial independence
KW - Judicial appointment
KW - Poland
KW - Supreme court
KW - Judicial review
M3 - Journal article
VL - 57
SP - 1107
EP - 1138
JO - Common Market Law Review
JF - Common Market Law Review
SN - 0165-0750
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 252981921