Decision-making by an authority under influence
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Decision-making by an authority under influence. / Tranæs, Torben.
I: Economics Letters, Bind 43, Nr. 1, 1993, s. 35-39.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Decision-making by an authority under influence
AU - Tranæs, Torben
PY - 1993
Y1 - 1993
N2 - A characteristic set of decision problems is given when an authority has to choose between a finite number of alternatives and is being influenced by a number of parties. For instance, the location of a firm when local authorities are competing for being the host, various types of lobbyism, or when a manager is being influenced by deputies. This paper argues that these problems can be analyzed as decision-making in a hierarchy using a common-agency framework. The main result is that even when the influential parties act simultaneously and the strategy sets are discrete, solutions to such decision problems as pure-strategy equilibria exist
AB - A characteristic set of decision problems is given when an authority has to choose between a finite number of alternatives and is being influenced by a number of parties. For instance, the location of a firm when local authorities are competing for being the host, various types of lobbyism, or when a manager is being influenced by deputies. This paper argues that these problems can be analyzed as decision-making in a hierarchy using a common-agency framework. The main result is that even when the influential parties act simultaneously and the strategy sets are discrete, solutions to such decision problems as pure-strategy equilibria exist
U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(93)90131-U
DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(93)90131-U
M3 - Journal article
VL - 43
SP - 35
EP - 39
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 157454