Co-operation as currency: how active coalitions affect lobbying success
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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Co-operation as currency : how active coalitions affect lobbying success. / Junk, Wiebke Marie.
I: Journal of European Public Policy, Bind 27, Nr. 6, 2020, s. 873-892.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Co-operation as currency
T2 - how active coalitions affect lobbying success
AU - Junk, Wiebke Marie
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Coalition action is a common lobbying strategy to exert influence over policy, but is rarely addressed in studies of lobbying success. This article adds to resource exchange theory, firstly, that active co-operation with others to gather information, optimize strategies and jointly signal a position should increase lobbying success similarly to spending economic resources on lobbying on an issue individually. Secondly, it expects important interactions between active co-operation and economic resources, because the costs and benefits of co-operation will be distributed unequally among partners who invest different levels of resources themselves. Using new survey data on lobbying on 50 policy issues in five European countries, the article provides strong support for these expectations: Active co-operation on an issue increases lobbying success measured as perceived influence. Moreover, it mediates the effect of individual economic resources on lobbying success.These findings have important methodological and normative implications regarding alternatives pathways of lobbying power.
AB - Coalition action is a common lobbying strategy to exert influence over policy, but is rarely addressed in studies of lobbying success. This article adds to resource exchange theory, firstly, that active co-operation with others to gather information, optimize strategies and jointly signal a position should increase lobbying success similarly to spending economic resources on lobbying on an issue individually. Secondly, it expects important interactions between active co-operation and economic resources, because the costs and benefits of co-operation will be distributed unequally among partners who invest different levels of resources themselves. Using new survey data on lobbying on 50 policy issues in five European countries, the article provides strong support for these expectations: Active co-operation on an issue increases lobbying success measured as perceived influence. Moreover, it mediates the effect of individual economic resources on lobbying success.These findings have important methodological and normative implications regarding alternatives pathways of lobbying power.
U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2019.1631377
DO - 10.1080/13501763.2019.1631377
M3 - Journal article
VL - 27
SP - 873
EP - 892
JO - Journal of European Public Policy
JF - Journal of European Public Policy
SN - 1350-1763
IS - 6
ER -
ID: 223926164