Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency
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Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency. / Schultz, Christian.
I: Economics Letters, Bind 123, 2014, s. 266-269.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency
AU - Schultz, Christian
N1 - JEL classification: L13, L41
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - This paper addresses price transparency on the consumer side in markets with behavioral pricediscrimination which feature welfare reducing brand switching. When long-term contracts are notavailable, an increase in transparency intensifies competition, lowers prices and profits, reduces brandswitching and benefits consumers and welfare. With long-term contracts, an increase in transparencyreduces the use of long-term contracts, leading to more brand switching and a welfare loss. Otherwise,the results are the same as without long-term contracts.
AB - This paper addresses price transparency on the consumer side in markets with behavioral pricediscrimination which feature welfare reducing brand switching. When long-term contracts are notavailable, an increase in transparency intensifies competition, lowers prices and profits, reduces brandswitching and benefits consumers and welfare. With long-term contracts, an increase in transparencyreduces the use of long-term contracts, leading to more brand switching and a welfare loss. Otherwise,the results are the same as without long-term contracts.
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.024
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.024
M3 - Journal article
VL - 123
SP - 266
EP - 269
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
ER -
ID: 125163673