Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
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- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
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We allocate objects to agents as exemplified primarily by school choice. Welfare judgments of the object-allocating agency are encoded as edge weights in the acceptability graph. The welfare of an allocation is the sum of its edge weights. We introduce the constrained welfare-maximizing solution, which is the allocation of highest welfare among the Pareto-efficient allocations. We identify conditions under which this solution is easily determined from a computational point of view. For the unrestricted case, we formulate an integer program and find this to be viable in practice as it quickly solves a real-world instance of kindergarten allocation and large-scale simulated instances. Incentives to report preferences truthfully are discussed briefly.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | European Journal of Operational Research |
Vol/bind | 91 |
Udgave nummer | 2 |
Sider (fra-til) | 614-628 |
Antal sider | 15 |
ISSN | 0377-2217 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2021 |
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