Advocacy intelligence and competition: Assessing lobbyists' sharing of tactical knowledge in focus group interviews
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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Advocacy intelligence and competition : Assessing lobbyists' sharing of tactical knowledge in focus group interviews. / Junk, Wiebke Marie; Berkhout, Joost; Crepaz, Michele; Hanegraaff, Marcel.
I: Governance, Bind 37, Nr. 2, 2024, s. 355-373.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Advocacy intelligence and competition
T2 - Assessing lobbyists' sharing of tactical knowledge in focus group interviews
AU - Junk, Wiebke Marie
AU - Berkhout, Joost
AU - Crepaz, Michele
AU - Hanegraaff, Marcel
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Advocacy intelligence is a critical organizational resource fostering long-term survival and policy success. Policy-active interest groups such as non-profits, business associations and labor unions, seek to maintain their competitive advantage among peers and therefore have incentives to remain secretive about the details of their lobbying strategies and membership mobilization. We empirically evaluate this argument based on knowledge sharing interactions in 12 focus group interviews with approximately 50 representatives of interest groups in the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark. Our research design manipulates the composition of the focus groups to vary the level of competition for political influence and membership among the participants. Strikingly, we find no evidence that either type of competition hampers knowledge sharing. Instead, our novel data point to three fruitful alternative explanations: the importance of socialization, mentorship and personalities of interest group leaders.
AB - Advocacy intelligence is a critical organizational resource fostering long-term survival and policy success. Policy-active interest groups such as non-profits, business associations and labor unions, seek to maintain their competitive advantage among peers and therefore have incentives to remain secretive about the details of their lobbying strategies and membership mobilization. We empirically evaluate this argument based on knowledge sharing interactions in 12 focus group interviews with approximately 50 representatives of interest groups in the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark. Our research design manipulates the composition of the focus groups to vary the level of competition for political influence and membership among the participants. Strikingly, we find no evidence that either type of competition hampers knowledge sharing. Instead, our novel data point to three fruitful alternative explanations: the importance of socialization, mentorship and personalities of interest group leaders.
U2 - 10.1111/gove.12767
DO - 10.1111/gove.12767
M3 - Journal article
VL - 37
SP - 355
EP - 373
JO - Governance
JF - Governance
SN - 0952-1895
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 337249094