A Spoonful of Sugar: Deference at the Court of Justice

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Standard

A Spoonful of Sugar : Deference at the Court of Justice. / López Zurita, Lucía; Brekke, Stein Arne.

I: JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 2023.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

López Zurita, L & Brekke, SA 2023, 'A Spoonful of Sugar: Deference at the Court of Justice', JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13547

APA

López Zurita, L., & Brekke, S. A. (2023). A Spoonful of Sugar: Deference at the Court of Justice. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13547

Vancouver

López Zurita L, Brekke SA. A Spoonful of Sugar: Deference at the Court of Justice. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 2023. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13547

Author

López Zurita, Lucía ; Brekke, Stein Arne. / A Spoonful of Sugar : Deference at the Court of Justice. I: JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 2023.

Bibtex

@article{dc2245acdd8e4f93b979c56db2defd80,
title = "A Spoonful of Sugar: Deference at the Court of Justice",
abstract = "This article analyses the European Court of Justice's strategic use of deference as a resilience technique in the preliminary reference procedure. It focuses on the strategic potential of using deference in two scenarios: first, when the Court uses teleological interpretation or expands the scope of the EU legal order and, second, when it declares national measures incompatible with EU law. The findings indicate that the Court is more likely to use deference when expanding EU law and less likely to defer when it declares national measures incompatible with EU law. The article challenges commonly held assumptions regarding the use of deference. First, the findings substantially qualify accounts linking the increase of deference to the maturity of the EU legal order and a certain halt of judicial activism. Deference allows the Court to explore new frontiers of EU law, suggesting that although the legal order might have matured, the Court does not perceive the project of legal integration as completed. Second, the article defies claims that deference is used by the Court as a {\textquoteleft}weapon of restraint{\textquoteright}.",
author = "{L{\'o}pez Zurita}, Luc{\'i}a and Brekke, {Stein Arne}",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1111/jcms.13547",
language = "English",
journal = "JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Spoonful of Sugar

T2 - Deference at the Court of Justice

AU - López Zurita, Lucía

AU - Brekke, Stein Arne

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - This article analyses the European Court of Justice's strategic use of deference as a resilience technique in the preliminary reference procedure. It focuses on the strategic potential of using deference in two scenarios: first, when the Court uses teleological interpretation or expands the scope of the EU legal order and, second, when it declares national measures incompatible with EU law. The findings indicate that the Court is more likely to use deference when expanding EU law and less likely to defer when it declares national measures incompatible with EU law. The article challenges commonly held assumptions regarding the use of deference. First, the findings substantially qualify accounts linking the increase of deference to the maturity of the EU legal order and a certain halt of judicial activism. Deference allows the Court to explore new frontiers of EU law, suggesting that although the legal order might have matured, the Court does not perceive the project of legal integration as completed. Second, the article defies claims that deference is used by the Court as a ‘weapon of restraint’.

AB - This article analyses the European Court of Justice's strategic use of deference as a resilience technique in the preliminary reference procedure. It focuses on the strategic potential of using deference in two scenarios: first, when the Court uses teleological interpretation or expands the scope of the EU legal order and, second, when it declares national measures incompatible with EU law. The findings indicate that the Court is more likely to use deference when expanding EU law and less likely to defer when it declares national measures incompatible with EU law. The article challenges commonly held assumptions regarding the use of deference. First, the findings substantially qualify accounts linking the increase of deference to the maturity of the EU legal order and a certain halt of judicial activism. Deference allows the Court to explore new frontiers of EU law, suggesting that although the legal order might have matured, the Court does not perceive the project of legal integration as completed. Second, the article defies claims that deference is used by the Court as a ‘weapon of restraint’.

U2 - 10.1111/jcms.13547

DO - 10.1111/jcms.13547

M3 - Journal article

JO - JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies

JF - JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies

ER -

ID: 368354029