A Paradigm Shift? Arbitration and Court-Like Mechanisms in Investors' Disputes
Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning
Recently, several court-like mechanisms have been considered as a substitute for investor-state arbitration. Suggestions for creating such mechanisms have been around for a long time, but new trade agreements may make court-like mechanisms for investors’ disputes a reality. This paper starts by asking whether the shift from arbitration to court-like mechanism is likely to happen and how deep is the change to dispute resolution going to be. The advantages and disadvantages of replacing ad-hoc arbitrators with court-like mechanisms are examined. Courts are more centralized than arbitrators, which gives them the ability to act in a coherent way and consider long-term consequences. However, centralization may imply a greater risk of capture by special interests and could lead to more radical legal developments than the stable system of diverse arbitration. Furthermore, compromise solutions that create numerous competing court-like mechanisms instead of a universal court may escalate the fragmentation of international law.
|Titel||Permanent Investment Courts : European Yearbook of International Economic Law|
|Redaktører||Günes Ünüvar, Joanna Lam, Shai Dothan|
|Status||Udgivet - 2020|
|Navn||European Yearbook of International Economic Law|