When Immediate Responses Fail

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When Immediate Responses Fail. / Dothan, Shai.

I: Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Bind 51, Nr. 4, 2018, s. 1075-1107.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskning

Harvard

Dothan, S 2018, 'When Immediate Responses Fail', Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, bind 51, nr. 4, s. 1075-1107.

APA

Dothan, S. (2018). When Immediate Responses Fail. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 51(4), 1075-1107.

Vancouver

Dothan S. When Immediate Responses Fail. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. 2018;51(4):1075-1107.

Author

Dothan, Shai. / When Immediate Responses Fail. I: Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. 2018 ; Bind 51, Nr. 4. s. 1075-1107.

Bibtex

@article{2b0d9a47dc27476691e1b00c52dee95b,
title = "When Immediate Responses Fail",
abstract = "Tit-for-tat is a strategy of immediate and proportional responses. Game theorists showed that this strategy often leads to fruitful cooperation. Indeed, many legal regimes resemble a tit-for-tat strategy and benefit from its ability to avoid unnecessary conflicts. But in situations of uncertainty—when actors cannot be sure about the actions of their adversaries—a tit-for-tat strategy would destroy cooperation and lead to continuous clashes. Because tit-for-tat responds immediately, a single mistake about the intentions of the adversary can lead to retaliation and start an endless string of counter-strikes. When uncertainty prevails, a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats is optimal. Actors applying this strategy study the actions of their adversary over multiple rounds without issuing an immediate response. Only when the actor is convinced that the adversary intentionally defects, the actor will issue a disproportionately forceful response. The laws of war, criminal law, and international sales law all face some situations of uncertainty. This paper argues that each of these legal fields adopts a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats to address conditions of acute uncertainty.",
author = "Shai Dothan",
year = "2018",
language = "English",
volume = "51",
pages = "1075--1107",
journal = "Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law",
issn = "0090-2594",
publisher = "Vanderbilt University Law School",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - When Immediate Responses Fail

AU - Dothan, Shai

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Tit-for-tat is a strategy of immediate and proportional responses. Game theorists showed that this strategy often leads to fruitful cooperation. Indeed, many legal regimes resemble a tit-for-tat strategy and benefit from its ability to avoid unnecessary conflicts. But in situations of uncertainty—when actors cannot be sure about the actions of their adversaries—a tit-for-tat strategy would destroy cooperation and lead to continuous clashes. Because tit-for-tat responds immediately, a single mistake about the intentions of the adversary can lead to retaliation and start an endless string of counter-strikes. When uncertainty prevails, a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats is optimal. Actors applying this strategy study the actions of their adversary over multiple rounds without issuing an immediate response. Only when the actor is convinced that the adversary intentionally defects, the actor will issue a disproportionately forceful response. The laws of war, criminal law, and international sales law all face some situations of uncertainty. This paper argues that each of these legal fields adopts a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats to address conditions of acute uncertainty.

AB - Tit-for-tat is a strategy of immediate and proportional responses. Game theorists showed that this strategy often leads to fruitful cooperation. Indeed, many legal regimes resemble a tit-for-tat strategy and benefit from its ability to avoid unnecessary conflicts. But in situations of uncertainty—when actors cannot be sure about the actions of their adversaries—a tit-for-tat strategy would destroy cooperation and lead to continuous clashes. Because tit-for-tat responds immediately, a single mistake about the intentions of the adversary can lead to retaliation and start an endless string of counter-strikes. When uncertainty prevails, a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats is optimal. Actors applying this strategy study the actions of their adversary over multiple rounds without issuing an immediate response. Only when the actor is convinced that the adversary intentionally defects, the actor will issue a disproportionately forceful response. The laws of war, criminal law, and international sales law all face some situations of uncertainty. This paper argues that each of these legal fields adopts a strategy of many-tits-for-many-tats to address conditions of acute uncertainty.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 51

SP - 1075

EP - 1107

JO - Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

JF - Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

SN - 0090-2594

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 195260537