The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms

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Standard

The Perception-Action Model : Counting Computational Mechanisms. / Grünbaum, Thor.

I: Mind & Language, Bind 32, Nr. 4, 09.2017, s. 416-445.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Grünbaum, T 2017, 'The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms', Mind & Language, bind 32, nr. 4, s. 416-445. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12147

APA

Grünbaum, T. (2017). The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms. Mind & Language, 32(4), 416-445. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12147

Vancouver

Grünbaum T. The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms. Mind & Language. 2017 sep;32(4):416-445. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12147

Author

Grünbaum, Thor. / The Perception-Action Model : Counting Computational Mechanisms. I: Mind & Language. 2017 ; Bind 32, Nr. 4. s. 416-445.

Bibtex

@article{9617d21bae2845a5ab947cfafd5fa977,
title = "The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms",
abstract = "Milner and Goodale’s Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH) is regarded as common ground in recent discussions of visual consciousness. A central part of TVSH is a functional model of vision and action (a functional perception-action model, PAM for short). In this paper, I provide a brief overview of these current discussions and argue that PAM is ambiguous between a strong and a weak version. I argue that, given a standard way of individuating computational mechanisms, the available evidence cannot be used to distinguish between these versions. This not only has consequences for philosophical theories of the role of visual consciousness but also has implications for the role of experimental evidence in model testing in cognitive neuroscience.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Two-Visual-Stream Hypothesis, computational mechanisms, representational formats, philosophy of science, model testing in cognitive neuroscience",
author = "Thor Gr{\"u}nbaum",
year = "2017",
month = "9",
doi = "10.1111/mila.12147",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "416--445",
journal = "Mind & Language",
issn = "0268-1064",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Perception-Action Model

T2 - Counting Computational Mechanisms

AU - Grünbaum, Thor

PY - 2017/9

Y1 - 2017/9

N2 - Milner and Goodale’s Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH) is regarded as common ground in recent discussions of visual consciousness. A central part of TVSH is a functional model of vision and action (a functional perception-action model, PAM for short). In this paper, I provide a brief overview of these current discussions and argue that PAM is ambiguous between a strong and a weak version. I argue that, given a standard way of individuating computational mechanisms, the available evidence cannot be used to distinguish between these versions. This not only has consequences for philosophical theories of the role of visual consciousness but also has implications for the role of experimental evidence in model testing in cognitive neuroscience.

AB - Milner and Goodale’s Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH) is regarded as common ground in recent discussions of visual consciousness. A central part of TVSH is a functional model of vision and action (a functional perception-action model, PAM for short). In this paper, I provide a brief overview of these current discussions and argue that PAM is ambiguous between a strong and a weak version. I argue that, given a standard way of individuating computational mechanisms, the available evidence cannot be used to distinguish between these versions. This not only has consequences for philosophical theories of the role of visual consciousness but also has implications for the role of experimental evidence in model testing in cognitive neuroscience.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Two-Visual-Stream Hypothesis

KW - computational mechanisms

KW - representational formats

KW - philosophy of science

KW - model testing in cognitive neuroscience

U2 - 10.1111/mila.12147

DO - 10.1111/mila.12147

M3 - Journal article

VL - 32

SP - 416

EP - 445

JO - Mind & Language

JF - Mind & Language

SN - 0268-1064

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 156414757