Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts

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Standard

Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. / Johannesen, Niels; Langetieg, Patrick ; Reck, Daniel; Risch, Max ; Slemrod, Joel .

I: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Bind 12, Nr. 3, 2020, s. 312-346.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Johannesen, N, Langetieg, P, Reck, D, Risch, M & Slemrod, J 2020, 'Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts', American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, bind 12, nr. 3, s. 312-346. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180410

APA

Johannesen, N., Langetieg, P., Reck, D., Risch, M., & Slemrod, J. (2020). Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 12(3), 312-346. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180410

Vancouver

Johannesen N, Langetieg P, Reck D, Risch M, Slemrod J. Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2020;12(3):312-346. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180410

Author

Johannesen, Niels ; Langetieg, Patrick ; Reck, Daniel ; Risch, Max ; Slemrod, Joel . / Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. I: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2020 ; Bind 12, Nr. 3. s. 312-346.

Bibtex

@article{b7ca1cb430f842da87b02ee337c9f287,
title = "Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts",
abstract = "In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers{\textquoteright} reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs, by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2-$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6-$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue. ",
author = "Niels Johannesen and Patrick Langetieg and Daniel Reck and Max Risch and Joel Slemrod",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1257/pol.20180410",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "312--346",
journal = "American Economic Journal: Economic Policy",
issn = "1945-7731",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts

AU - Johannesen, Niels

AU - Langetieg, Patrick

AU - Reck, Daniel

AU - Risch, Max

AU - Slemrod, Joel

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs, by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2-$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6-$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.

AB - In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs, by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2-$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6-$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.

U2 - 10.1257/pol.20180410

DO - 10.1257/pol.20180410

M3 - Journal article

VL - 12

SP - 312

EP - 346

JO - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

JF - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

SN - 1945-7731

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 234022986