Syndicated Loans and Competition Law

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

While the issuing of loans to companies is a core functionality of modern banking, the size, or risk, of a request can exceed the limits, or appetite, of a single bank giving ground for syndication where the funding comes from a collegium of lenders. This not only provides better risk management, but also, allows smaller institutions, and non-banks, access to a highly lucrative market segment inducing competition. Syndication can also limit competition if participants form closed circles, coordinate prices, or bundle services, which is why competition authorities lately have taken an interest in the matter.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of European Competition Law & Practice
Vol/bind13
Udgave nummer5
Sider (fra-til)323-335
Antal sider13
ISSN2041-7764
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2022

ID: 289309031