Subjective Performance Evaluations, Self-esteem, and Ego-threats in Principal-agent Relations

Publikation: Working paperForskning


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We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefiting from a real effort task in which the agents' effort/performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. We find that agents sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self-evaluations even if the agents' payoff is independent of the principals' feedback. Based on our experimental analysis we propose a principal-agent model with subjective performance evaluations that accommodates this finding. We analyze the agents' (optimal) behavior, optimal contracts, and social welfare in this environment.
UdgiverDepartment of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Antal sider18
StatusUdgivet - 2010

Bibliografisk note

JEL classifications: D01, D02, D82, D86, J41

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