Promotions and Incentives: The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments
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Promotions and Incentives : The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments. / Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Wibral, Matthias.
I: Journal of Labor Economics, Bind 30, Nr. 1, 01.01.2012, s. 149-174.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Promotions and Incentives
T2 - The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments
AU - Altmann, Steffen
AU - Falk, Armin
AU - Wibral, Matthias
PY - 2012/1/1
Y1 - 2012/1/1
N2 - Promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms. We analyze incentives in multistage elimination tournaments with controlled laboratory experiments. In our two main treatments, we compare a two-stage tournament to a one-stage tournament. Subjects in the two-stage treatment provide excess effort in the first stage, both with respect to Nash predictions and compared to the strategically equivalent one-stage tournament. Additional control treatments confirm that excess effort in early stages is a robust finding and suggest that above-equilibrium effort might be driven by limited degrees of forward-looking behavior and subjects deriving nonmonetary value from competing.
AB - Promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms. We analyze incentives in multistage elimination tournaments with controlled laboratory experiments. In our two main treatments, we compare a two-stage tournament to a one-stage tournament. Subjects in the two-stage treatment provide excess effort in the first stage, both with respect to Nash predictions and compared to the strategically equivalent one-stage tournament. Additional control treatments confirm that excess effort in early stages is a robust finding and suggest that above-equilibrium effort might be driven by limited degrees of forward-looking behavior and subjects deriving nonmonetary value from competing.
U2 - 10.1086/662130
DO - 10.1086/662130
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:84856006160
VL - 30
SP - 149
EP - 174
JO - Journal of Labor Economics
JF - Journal of Labor Economics
SN - 0734-306X
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 126372412