Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider

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Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider. / Jensen, Rasmus Thybo.

I: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Bind 8, Nr. 3, 09.2009, s. 371-388.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Jensen, RT 2009, 'Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider', Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, bind 8, nr. 3, s. 371-388. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-009-9122-x

APA

Jensen, R. T. (2009). Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8(3), 371-388. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-009-9122-x

Vancouver

Jensen RT. Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 2009 sep.;8(3):371-388. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-009-9122-x

Author

Jensen, Rasmus Thybo. / Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider. I: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 2009 ; Bind 8, Nr. 3. s. 371-388.

Bibtex

@article{227948db643f48cd9a094cba58bc9802,
title = "Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider",
abstract = "I argue that Merleau-Ponty{\textquoteright}s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty{\textquoteright}s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty{\textquoteright}s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein. ",
author = "Jensen, {Rasmus Thybo}",
year = "2009",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1007/s11097-009-9122-x",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
pages = "371--388",
journal = "Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences",
issn = "1568-7759",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider

AU - Jensen, Rasmus Thybo

PY - 2009/9

Y1 - 2009/9

N2 - I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.

AB - I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.

U2 - 10.1007/s11097-009-9122-x

DO - 10.1007/s11097-009-9122-x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 8

SP - 371

EP - 388

JO - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

JF - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

SN - 1568-7759

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 32647394