Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability

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Standard

Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability. / Andersen, Asger Lau; Lassen, David Dreyer; Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh.

I: PLoS ONE, Bind 15, Nr. 3, e0229789, 02.03.2020.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Andersen, AL, Lassen, DD & Nielsen, LHW 2020, 'Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability', PLoS ONE, bind 15, nr. 3, e0229789. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0229789

APA

Andersen, A. L., Lassen, D. D., & Nielsen, L. H. W. (2020). Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability. PLoS ONE, 15(3), [e0229789]. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0229789

Vancouver

Andersen AL, Lassen DD, Nielsen LHW. Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability. PLoS ONE. 2020 mar 2;15(3). e0229789. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0229789

Author

Andersen, Asger Lau ; Lassen, David Dreyer ; Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh. / Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability. I: PLoS ONE. 2020 ; Bind 15, Nr. 3.

Bibtex

@article{bd7e3220ddeb44428ce4e7e13d9dd0ec,
title = "Irresponsible parties, responsible voters?: Legislative gridlock and collective accountability",
abstract = "Legislative gridlock is a failure of one of the key functions of government: to pass legislation. Can voters counter such political dysfunction? This paper examines whether and how voters hold politicians accountable for gridlock. We focus on the passage of the government budget, the central task of any legislature, and define a legislature to experience budgetary gridlock if it fails to pass the budget on time. We argue, based on evidence from twenty years of budget enactment data, that voters hold state legislators accountable for budget gridlock in US state governments, with gridlocked incumbents losing their seat more often than incumbents passing budgets on time. Based on established theories of party organization in American politics, we develop three competing theoretical hypotheses to guide our understanding of the observed patterns of retrospective voting. We find strong support for collective electoral accountability with voters punishing incumbent members of state legislature majority parties.",
author = "Andersen, {Asger Lau} and Lassen, {David Dreyer} and Nielsen, {Lasse Holb{\o}ll Westh}",
year = "2020",
month = mar,
day = "2",
doi = "10.1371/journal.pone.0229789",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
journal = "P L o S One",
issn = "1932-6203",
publisher = "Public Library of Science",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Irresponsible parties, responsible voters?

T2 - Legislative gridlock and collective accountability

AU - Andersen, Asger Lau

AU - Lassen, David Dreyer

AU - Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh

PY - 2020/3/2

Y1 - 2020/3/2

N2 - Legislative gridlock is a failure of one of the key functions of government: to pass legislation. Can voters counter such political dysfunction? This paper examines whether and how voters hold politicians accountable for gridlock. We focus on the passage of the government budget, the central task of any legislature, and define a legislature to experience budgetary gridlock if it fails to pass the budget on time. We argue, based on evidence from twenty years of budget enactment data, that voters hold state legislators accountable for budget gridlock in US state governments, with gridlocked incumbents losing their seat more often than incumbents passing budgets on time. Based on established theories of party organization in American politics, we develop three competing theoretical hypotheses to guide our understanding of the observed patterns of retrospective voting. We find strong support for collective electoral accountability with voters punishing incumbent members of state legislature majority parties.

AB - Legislative gridlock is a failure of one of the key functions of government: to pass legislation. Can voters counter such political dysfunction? This paper examines whether and how voters hold politicians accountable for gridlock. We focus on the passage of the government budget, the central task of any legislature, and define a legislature to experience budgetary gridlock if it fails to pass the budget on time. We argue, based on evidence from twenty years of budget enactment data, that voters hold state legislators accountable for budget gridlock in US state governments, with gridlocked incumbents losing their seat more often than incumbents passing budgets on time. Based on established theories of party organization in American politics, we develop three competing theoretical hypotheses to guide our understanding of the observed patterns of retrospective voting. We find strong support for collective electoral accountability with voters punishing incumbent members of state legislature majority parties.

U2 - 10.1371/journal.pone.0229789

DO - 10.1371/journal.pone.0229789

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 32119706

VL - 15

JO - P L o S One

JF - P L o S One

SN - 1932-6203

IS - 3

M1 - e0229789

ER -

ID: 237006188