Inequality and Corruption: Evidence from US States

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Inequality and Corruption : Evidence from US States. / Alt, James E.; Lassen, David Dreyer.

Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2008.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Alt, JE & Lassen, DD 2008 'Inequality and Corruption: Evidence from US States' Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2008). Inequality and Corruption: Evidence from US States. Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Alt JE, Lassen DD. Inequality and Corruption: Evidence from US States. Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2008.

Author

Alt, James E. ; Lassen, David Dreyer. / Inequality and Corruption : Evidence from US States. Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2008.

Bibtex

@techreport{69b36ab0742911dd8d9f000ea68e967b,
title = "Inequality and Corruption: Evidence from US States",
abstract = "High-quality data on state-level inequality and incomes, panel data on corruption convictions, and careful attention to the consequences of including or excluding fixed effects in the panel specification allow us to estimate the impact of income considerations on the decision to undertake corrupt acts. Following efficiency wage arguments, for a given institutional environment the corruptible employee's or official's decision to engage in corruption is affected by relative wages and expected tenure in the public sector, the probability of detection, the cost of fines and jail terms, and the degree of inequality, which indicate diminished prospects facing those convicted of corruption. In US states over 25 years we show that inequality and higher government relative wages significantly and robustly produce less corruption. This reverses other findings of a positive association between inequality and corruption, which we show arises from long-run joint causation by unobserved factors. ",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, rent seeking, Gini coefficient, efficiency wage, public sector wages",
author = "Alt, {James E.} and Lassen, {David Dreyer}",
note = "JEL classification: D72, D73, P48",
year = "2008",
language = "English",
publisher = "Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Inequality and Corruption

T2 - Evidence from US States

AU - Alt, James E.

AU - Lassen, David Dreyer

N1 - JEL classification: D72, D73, P48

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - High-quality data on state-level inequality and incomes, panel data on corruption convictions, and careful attention to the consequences of including or excluding fixed effects in the panel specification allow us to estimate the impact of income considerations on the decision to undertake corrupt acts. Following efficiency wage arguments, for a given institutional environment the corruptible employee's or official's decision to engage in corruption is affected by relative wages and expected tenure in the public sector, the probability of detection, the cost of fines and jail terms, and the degree of inequality, which indicate diminished prospects facing those convicted of corruption. In US states over 25 years we show that inequality and higher government relative wages significantly and robustly produce less corruption. This reverses other findings of a positive association between inequality and corruption, which we show arises from long-run joint causation by unobserved factors.

AB - High-quality data on state-level inequality and incomes, panel data on corruption convictions, and careful attention to the consequences of including or excluding fixed effects in the panel specification allow us to estimate the impact of income considerations on the decision to undertake corrupt acts. Following efficiency wage arguments, for a given institutional environment the corruptible employee's or official's decision to engage in corruption is affected by relative wages and expected tenure in the public sector, the probability of detection, the cost of fines and jail terms, and the degree of inequality, which indicate diminished prospects facing those convicted of corruption. In US states over 25 years we show that inequality and higher government relative wages significantly and robustly produce less corruption. This reverses other findings of a positive association between inequality and corruption, which we show arises from long-run joint causation by unobserved factors.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - rent seeking

KW - Gini coefficient

KW - efficiency wage

KW - public sector wages

M3 - Working paper

BT - Inequality and Corruption

PB - Economic Policy Research Unit. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 5731544