A Blind Casting into the Evidential Sea: A Closer Look at How Undermining a Defendant's Fundamental Rights in Investigatory Proceedings can Decrease the Efficacy and Sustainability of Leniency Programs - Master's Thesis

Publikation: Bog/antologi/afhandling/rapportBogForskningfagfællebedømt

In the wake of increased globalisation with undertakings strategically targeting their production and logistics across borders for profit maximisation and optimal cost reduction, competition for consumers’ business is fierce, whereby pressures on players can be the impetus for collusion and anti-competitive agreements to obtain better profit margins and market power outside what is dictated by supply and demand in free market economies. Violative undertakings are becoming increasingly savvy at keeping their activities secret due to the negative stigmatisation and severe fines that attach to such behaviour upon detection. This makes uncovering evidence of said behaviour increasingly difficult as companies go to great lengths to remain imperceptible, until such time that stakes become intolerably high and the fear of detection becomes irrefutably plausible that undertakings will admit or acknowledge their participation in collusive activities to circumvent the impact of stringent sanctioning. The leniency program has emerged as a stealth tool in the fight against competition disruption as it utilises time and fear as conduits to obtain complete exoneration from severe fines in exchange for evidence that successfully leads to the initiation of an investigation to uncover said anti-competitive infringement. But as the severity of fines attached to this type of unlawful behaviour increases, the expectation that predictability and transparency will be implemented in procedural protocol and investigatory policy intensifies, to assure proper protection of a Defendant’s fundamental rights to enhance the efficacy and sustainability of leniency programs. This article makes the case that proper protection of Defendants’ fundamental rights, through the enhancement of procedural predictability and increased evidentiary transparency, will lead to more efficient, efficacious and sustainable leniency programs equating to more fear of violative behaviour detection, an increased acknowledgment of anti-competitive participation, and enhanced overall cartel destabilisation for more balanced competition in the marketplace.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
ForlagRīgas Juridiskā Augstskola
Antal sider102
StatusUdgivet - jan. 2016
Eksternt udgivetJa

ID: 316917503