Information, polarization and term length in democracy

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Information, polarization and term length in democracy. / Schultz, Christian.

I: Journal of Public Economics, Bind 92, Nr. 5-6, 2008, s. 1078-1091.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Schultz, C 2008, 'Information, polarization and term length in democracy', Journal of Public Economics, bind 92, nr. 5-6, s. 1078-1091. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.008

APA

Schultz, C. (2008). Information, polarization and term length in democracy. Journal of Public Economics, 92(5-6), 1078-1091. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.008

Vancouver

Schultz C. Information, polarization and term length in democracy. Journal of Public Economics. 2008;92(5-6):1078-1091. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.008

Author

Schultz, Christian. / Information, polarization and term length in democracy. I: Journal of Public Economics. 2008 ; Bind 92, Nr. 5-6. s. 1078-1091.

Bibtex

@article{c1e08a4011d411ddbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Information, polarization and term length in democracy",
abstract = "This paper considers term lengths in a representative democracy where the political issue divides the population on the left-right scale. Parties are ideologically different and better informed about the consequences of policies than voters are. A short term length makes the government more accountable, but the re-election incentive leads to policy-distortion as the government seeks to manipulate swing voters' beliefs to make its ideology more popular. This creates a trade-off: A short term length improves accountability but gives distortions. A short term length is best for swing voters when the uncertainty is large and parties are not very polarized. Partisan voters always prefer a long term length. When politicians learn while in office a long term length becomes more attractive for swing voters.",
author = "Christian Schultz",
note = "JEL classification: D72, H1, H7, K4",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.008",
language = "English",
volume = "92",
pages = "1078--1091",
journal = "Journal of Public Economics",
issn = "0047-2727",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "5-6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Information, polarization and term length in democracy

AU - Schultz, Christian

N1 - JEL classification: D72, H1, H7, K4

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - This paper considers term lengths in a representative democracy where the political issue divides the population on the left-right scale. Parties are ideologically different and better informed about the consequences of policies than voters are. A short term length makes the government more accountable, but the re-election incentive leads to policy-distortion as the government seeks to manipulate swing voters' beliefs to make its ideology more popular. This creates a trade-off: A short term length improves accountability but gives distortions. A short term length is best for swing voters when the uncertainty is large and parties are not very polarized. Partisan voters always prefer a long term length. When politicians learn while in office a long term length becomes more attractive for swing voters.

AB - This paper considers term lengths in a representative democracy where the political issue divides the population on the left-right scale. Parties are ideologically different and better informed about the consequences of policies than voters are. A short term length makes the government more accountable, but the re-election incentive leads to policy-distortion as the government seeks to manipulate swing voters' beliefs to make its ideology more popular. This creates a trade-off: A short term length improves accountability but gives distortions. A short term length is best for swing voters when the uncertainty is large and parties are not very polarized. Partisan voters always prefer a long term length. When politicians learn while in office a long term length becomes more attractive for swing voters.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.008

DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.008

M3 - Journal article

VL - 92

SP - 1078

EP - 1091

JO - Journal of Public Economics

T2 - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

SN - 0047-2727

IS - 5-6

ER -

ID: 3798074