Compliance and enforcement are important issues from an economic point of view because management measures are useless without a certain level of enforcement. These conclusions come from the well-established theoretical literature on compliance and enforcement problems within fisheries. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating compliance and enforcement in the empirical case of a mixed trawl fishery targeting Norway lobster in Kattegat and Skagerrak located north of Denmark with help from a simulated model. The paper presents results from two simulation models of the case study: one for a single output and a single enforcement tool and one for multiple outputs and multiple enforcement tools. The results of the simulation models are compared to the benchmark case, defined as the enforcement situation in the baseline year. The paper discusses the consequences of policy intervention at the level of compliance and the private and social benefits of varying enforcement intensities, penalties and management measures as well as combinations thereof. The empirical investigation of the case study indicates the current level of control is too low compared to the optimal level of enforcement. Another conclusion from the case study is that only small welfare effects are obtained by increasing enforcement efforts to reduce non-compliance.