Information, polarization and term length in democracy
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
This paper considers term lengths in a representative democracy where the political issue divides the population on the left-right scale. Parties are ideologically different and better informed about the consequences of policies than voters are. A short term length makes the government more accountable, but the re-election incentive leads to policy-distortion as the government seeks to manipulate swing voters' beliefs to make its ideology more popular. This creates a trade-off: A short term length improves accountability but gives distortions. A short term length is best for swing voters when the uncertainty is large and parties are not very polarized. Partisan voters always prefer a long term length. When politicians learn while in office a long term length becomes more attractive for swing voters.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
Volume | 92 |
Issue number | 5-6 |
Pages (from-to) | 1078-1091 |
Number of pages | 14 |
ISSN | 0047-2727 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2008 |
ID: 3798074